Sunday, March 4, 2012

The Second Response to the Kalam Cosmological Argument

Here is my quick summary of the discussion I am having with Edward Oleander (his pseudonym). We are looking at the Kalam Cosmological argument, which is a "proof" for the existence of God - which simply states:

  1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
  2. The universe began to exist.
  3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.

In Ed's first response, he disagreed with all three of these positions. His first Response, and my reply were posted here on February 19th. Here is Ed's second response:


 

Ed: Making it simple is really tough, because there isn't a nice simple answer. The response I gave WAS simple, because I sure don't understand the nuances of M-Theory. John went way further in Physics than I did, and might be able to explain it better than I can. Do you remember when I used to joke about my "All points are the same" theory? It looks like I have may have been closer than I realized. If M-Theory pans out, it might turn out that every particle in the universe travels EVERYWHERE simultaneously, which would effectively mean that space is actually non-existent. The big challenge left for M-Theory and Quantum theory is that they don't mesh well yet. We still have lots more to learn. Hawking has convinced me that some sub-atomic particle do indeed pop out of nothing, then disappear again... The Grand Design is his most readable work yet, thanks to his lab assistant who does most of the writing, but he doesn't even get into the guts of the math that substantiates his claims, since it would be like trying to read ancient Greek even for me. Clay might have the best grasp of anyone I know.


 

I firmly believe in the Big Bang, and we keep getting closer to being able to describe how it worked. The philosophical discussion is about what came before the Big Bang, and is ours the only universe there is? We can accurately describe the universe to within 1/10000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000th of a second after the Big Bang, but then things get fuzzy. What we know as the Laws of Physics didn't begin to form until that point, so we don't know how to quantify what happened before that tiny amount of time had passed. Hawking thinks there could be as many as (editor's note, Ed actually wrote out the number, but by my eyeball count it is somewhere near 1 x 10 to the 250th power) distinct universes besides our own...


 

Tom's Reply: Here is what I know about Stephen Hawking's "M-Theory" from my two minutes looking at it online: "M-theory" deals with the "superstring theory". It doesn't look like it's helpful, because it lacks predictive power, and it's untestable (see, Wikipedia entry for "M-Theory"). It doesn't even sound like it has many supporters, so I'm not sure why you are bringing it up, other than its interesting to talk about something you've read.


 

Now when you bring up the possibility of there being a lot of "multi-verses", this is an argument that I can get my tiny-little head around. Let's sidestep Hawking's use of the math to support his idea of multi-verses for now. But because you have told me that you accept the 'Big Bang' theory, and that there is a finite number of other universes out there, I believe that you have conceded Point 2 of the Kalam Cosmological Argument – Judge John, can I have a ruling here?


 

But Hawking's number is soooo large that to me it's an imaginary number. So even if you claim there are an infinite number of "multi-verses" out there, I don't think this helps your argument. If you are claiming that there are an infinite number of other universes then you are saying that all possibilities exist somewhere. So people like Hawking, assume that with so many universes, it is possible that in at least one of them, life will exist on Earth. Wasn't there a Star Trek episode on this, with the good Spock, and the evil Spock meeting?


 

But getting back to the philosophical argument of whether the universe began to exist – if you believe that there are infinite other realities out there, how can you be sure of anything? Isn't this some sort of philosophical fallacy where you are arguing that somewhere out there anything is possible, so we can't trust anything we understand? You said :"It gets way weirder than that even... If Hawking is right, then what you remember from yesterday might not have happened. The past is only a set of probabilities based on what happens in the future. Because you remember yesterday, there is a really, really, really, high probability that it will always be the past, but it is mathematically possible for it to change…" By making this argument, aren't you falling victim to a tautology: if everything can be true, nothing is.


 

So on what points do we have an agreement on? And is this helping in crystallizing your thoughts on this topic? Thanks again for the discussion. /s/Tom

3 comments:

Anonymous said...

JUDGE JOHN RULES:


Although Ed is technically correct about the actual flashpoint of the Big Bang & also when he says that “one cannot say what state (if any) this universe was (or wasn't) under before the Big Bang” it is not an unreasonable step to conclude that the Big Bang itself was the beginning of this universe. Since he has stated that he accepts the Big Bang theory and he hasn’t provided adequate evidence to the contrary, I would conclude that it constitutes a concession of Point 2 (unless he can produce evidence to the contrary without resorting to Argumentum ad Verecundium, in his referrals to Hawking’s book). Therefore, & this would probably get me in trouble with Clay, I summarily rule in favor of the advocate for the Kalem Argument. Objection sustained.

Anonymous said...

Ed Replies: I will accept that THIS incarnation of THIS universe had a beginning in the Big Bang.


In fact, for the sake of argument, I will accept the simplest form of the Kalam argument, just to see the mental acrobatics necessary to get from "The universe has a cause" to "The God of the Bible did it"...

tom wolff said...

Thank you Ed, I look forward to the challenge of "proving" Kalam's argument #3.